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1513 
DROWNING IN A SEA OF CONFUSION: 
APPLYING THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
TO COMPONENT PARTS, SERVICE CONTRACTS, 
AND FRAUD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The economic loss doctrine bars tort claims, and the broader damage 
awards associated with tort law,1 when economic losses arise from a 
contractual relationship.2 The doctrine was judicially developed to protect 
the right to allocate economic risks in contract.3 By reinforcing the basic 
legal policy of forcing injured parties to pay for their own loss if no duty 
was breached, the doctrine maintains a fundamental distinction between 
tort and contract law.4 It encourages commercial purchasers to consider 
and protect against economic risks because they are in the best position to 
consider the risk of loss associated with their use of a product or service.5 
The economic loss doctrine has existed for more than forty years. Yet 
judges, lawyers, legal scholars, and practitioners spend countless hours 
arguing over its meaning, application, and scope. One of the reasons the 
doctrine causes such great confusion is that its application is not contained 
within any single discipline of the law. Economic loss functions where tort 
meets contract law, plays a major role in directing insurance and warranty 
law, applies to both strict liability and negligence, and affects cases both 
large and small.  
Due to the doctrine’s wide-ranging impact, courts struggle to find a 
universal definition and litigators frequently challenge its boundaries.6 The 
vast confusion over this area of the law is demonstrated not only by the 
 
 
 1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). Different purposes underlie damage 
awards in tort and contract law. While contract law seeks to put an individual in the place they would 
have been had the contract been performed, tort law seeks to put a person in a position equal to the 
state of affairs before the tort was committed. Id. at cmt. a. Tort law also seeks to punish wrongdoers, 
deter wrongful conduct, and vindicate parties; thus, punitive damages are appropriate. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c)(d) (1979). 
 2. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 662 N.W.2d 652, 659 (Wis. 2003). 
 3. Id.; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Wis. 1999). 
 4. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Deleval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986). 
 5. Digicorp, 662 N.W.2d at 659. 
 6. Christopher W. Arledge, Is the California Supreme Court Confusing the Boundaries of the 
Economic Loss Rule?, 47 MY ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 22, 23 (2005). Arledge notes that the dividing 
line is challenged frequently in areas such as defective product litigation where tort law and contract 
law have traditional and substantial roles. Id. 
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language commentators use to describe the doctrine,7 but also by the 
number of cases appealing misapplications of the doctrine.8 Even in 
California, where the theory adopted by a majority of courts was first 
articulated,9 on four occasions in the last seven years, cases reached the 
state’s supreme court to clarify its dimensions.10 Within this time, 
California appellate courts have aggravated the problem by reaching 
conclusions that are unsupported and contrary to the policy behind the 
economic loss doctrine.11 In the end, even practiced litigators in this area 
find that these cases “leave[] lower courts and litigants with little 
understanding as to where the economic loss rule ends and standard tort 
law begins.”12  
Unfortunately, this very confusion destroys the societal value of the 
doctrine. Tort law is designed to maximize public welfare; thus, a law 
denying recovery when a competitive business suffers losses is a more 
efficient solution than allowing recovery under a negligence theory.13 
Where uncertainty leads to unnecessary lawsuits and settlements based on 
fear rather than an understanding of the law, the goals of tort law are 
defeated. The problem can be best illustrated by considering the most 
common situation where economic loss claims are raised.  
 
 
 7. The economic loss rule has been called “one of the most confusing doctrines in tort law,” R. 
Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and 
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1789 (2000), “obscure,” John J. 
Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 225, 225 (2005), 
and “a confusing morass,” Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So.2d 532, 544 (Fla. 
2004) (Cantero, J., concurring).  
 8. See Laubmeier, supra note 7, at 225 (finding that the doctrine was the subject at issue in 
forty-seven cases between 2000 and 2004 in either the Wisconsin Court of Appeals or the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court). Recent cases have also clarified elements of the economic loss doctrine in 
jurisdictions around the country. Me. Rubber Int’l v. Envt’l Mgmt. Group, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 133 
(D. Me. 2004); Indem. Ins. Co., 891 So.2d at 544; Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes Inc., 83 P.3d 
1257 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).  
 9. Christopher Scott D’Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law 
from Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 591 (1995). See also East River, 476 U.S. at 868 
(recognizing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965), as the case that created the 
economic loss rule).  
 10. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004); Jimenez v. Superior 
Court, 58 P.3d 450 (Cal. 2002); Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2000); Erlich v. Menezes, 
981 P.2d 978 (Cal. 1999). 
 11. See infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 12. Arledge, supra note 6, at 22. 
 13. William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages: The Shortcomings 
of the Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 347–48 (1986). The denial of damages is more 
efficient because allowing recovery would have an ultimate result of deterring conduct. If we assume 
that individuals contract only when the contract provides benefits in excess of not contracting, 
deterrence of desired terms is inefficient. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/4
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The economic loss doctrine is usually raised as an early defense to tort 
claims when the contracted-for work of the defendant disappoints the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff files suit and claims entitlement to both contract and 
tort remedies. The defendant responds by noting the terms of a warranty 
and moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s tort claims because tort damages are 
not available due to the economic loss doctrine.14 Negotiations ensue, but 
the parties cannot reach a settlement because the expectations of the 
plaintiff based on potential tort remedies greatly exceed the defendant’s 
offer based only on contractual damages.15 Although this simple example 
suggests that precedent would eventually find an efficient outcome, the 
fact-specific variations to the problem have made universal understanding 
an elusive goal. The scope of the economic loss doctrine is continually 
relitigated because of the value difference between contract and tort 
remedies,16 as well as the confused body of case law.  
The application of the economic loss doctrine determines the default 
remedies in a contractual relationship. Therefore, a universal 
understanding of the doctrine promotes informed negotiations and the best 
available outcome. Nonetheless, the contrast between the historical 
underpinnings of the doctrine and recent decisions demonstrates the 
difficultly in achieving this efficient result.  
This Note suggests a conceptual model for uniform application of the 
doctrine, and it argues that categorical standards based on the scope of the 
contract, rather than the type of contract, should be employed unless the 
contract is voidable.17 Using this standard, this Note defines the limitations 
 
 
 14. KB Home v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the 
economic loss rule can be the “functional equivalent of a common law motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.”). In many cases the economic loss doctrine is used to dismiss tort claims from the 
complaint before the case reaches trial. See id.  
 15. Along with a significant decrease in the risk, many cases that only claim damages based on 
contract claims will be dismissed completely, or settled quickly, because the warranty often excludes 
the damages asserted by the plaintiff. Additionally, the defendant is willing to pay the cost of the 
warranty rather than fees associated with defending the case. 
 16. The value of tort and contract damages may be significantly different because although 
punitive and emotional loss damages are generally not available in contracts, those damages are 
potentially available in tort. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 353, 355 (1981) 
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979). Furthermore, the standard of proof for contract 
damages is significantly more restrictive than the standard in tort cases. Compare RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) (“Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that 
the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.”) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 912 (1979) (requiring as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances 
permit).  
 17. Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 986 (Cal. 1999). See also infra notes 125–28 and 
accompanying text. Erlich held that tort damages are permitted for a breach of contract duty in 
California only when “the duty that gives rise to tort liability is either completely independent of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and exceptions to the economic loss doctrine, such as the “other property” 
exception,18 the service exception,19 and the fraud and intentional 
misrepresentation exception.20 Finally, this Note will present an 
understanding of the economic loss doctrine that combines the theoretical 
underpinnings of the law with the practical necessity for settled law. This 
Note will suggest a universally applicable doctrine based on categorical 
balancing that furthers the goals of efficiency.  
II. HISTORY 
The economic loss doctrine originated in strict liability cases as a 
defense to tort liability when parties had allocated risk through contract 
with specific warranty provisions covering potential product defects.21 The 
doctrine developed in 1965 when the Supreme Court of California ruled in 
 
 
contract or arises from conduct which is both intentional and intended to harm.” Id. Torts are 
considered independent either when they are outside the realm of contract or when they make the 
contract voidable and leave the parties to deal with tort law. Id. 
 18. See Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying Georgia law). 
Flintkote explains that in the case of injury to other property, that is, property not included in the 
contract, the duty breached arises independently of the contract. See infra notes 50–60 and 
accompanying text. 
 19. See Daniel Rapaport et al., Tort Killer: The Applicability of the Economic Loss Doctrine to 
Service Contracts, 20 ME. BAR J. 100 (2005). See also infra notes 61–82 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004) (finding tort 
recovery available when a parts manufacturer falsely certified the quality of metal used before 
distributing a part to be used in constructing helicopters). See also infra notes 82–95 and 
accompanying text. 
 Some jurisdictions once recognized a public safety exception to economic loss. Northridge Co. v. 
W.R. Grace & Co., 471 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1991). The public safety exception was similar to the 
“sudden and calamitous loss” exception, which was also used in some jurisdictions. See D’Angelo, 
supra note 9, at 601. Most courts have now rejected exceptions based on judicial determinations of 
danger because these exceptions base the risk and responsibility associated with an accident on the 
results of the accident. Id. at 601–03. Although the exception is now recognized as a circular 
methodology for determining responsibility, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, 
Oregon, and West Virginia all espoused such exceptions at one time. Id. at 601 n.88. 
 21. Strict products liability grants recovery in tort to the purchaser of an unsafe product. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979). It was the first comprehensive theory to overcome 
the traditional barriers to imposing liability for injuries caused by defective products. MATTHEW 
BENDER & CO., INC., 1–6 PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 6.04 (2005) [hereinafter PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE]. Strict liability overcame both the inability to trace a defect to specific 
misconduct of the manufacturer and the lack of privity between the purchaser and manufacturer. Id. 
Furthermore, it provided an incentive for the manufacturer, the party with the most knowledge and 
control over the product, to insure against the risk of loss. Id. 
 The policy concerns supporting strict products liability did not apply in cases where sophisticated 
parties negotiated the risk of loss. Thus, the economic loss doctrine limited the scope of strict liability 
to those cases where the policy behind the law was applicable. See infra notes 24–33, 39 and 
accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/4
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Seely v. White Motor Co.22 that tort liability was not appropriate under a 
strict liability theory for the losses maintained when a truck overturned 
without injuring anyone.23 The court reasoned that the buyer of the truck 
suffered losses only because the truck failed to perform up to expectations; 
thus, tort damages were not appropriate.24 Because the losses were 
economic in nature, Justice Roger Trayor25 explained that the claim was 
grounded in contract and that consumers can “be fairly charged with the 
risk that the product will not match . . . [their] economic expectations 
unless the manufacturer agrees that it will.”26 
 
 
 22. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
 23. Id. at 150. In Seely, the plaintiff purchased a truck that bounced violently when it was used 
for heavy duty hauling. Id. at 147. After many unsuccessful attempts to fix this problem under 
warranty, the plaintiff encountered even greater problems when the brakes failed during a turn. Id. The 
truck overturned and was damaged in the amount of $5,466.09, but the plaintiff was not injured. Id. 
After the accident, the plaintiff stopped making payments on the truck and the truck seller repossessed 
the vehicle. Id. The plaintiff then brought action against the seller and the truck manufacturer seeking 
damages for repair of the truck, lost profits, and loss of use. Id. at 147–48.  
 The trial court found that the manufacturer was liable for breach of warranty for payments made 
on the defective truck. Id. at 148. The manufacturer, however, could not be held liable for tort damages 
under a strict liability cause of action because the plaintiff was unable to prove causation in the 
accident. Id. On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the law of 
warranty governs the economic relations between parties. Id. at 152.  
 24. Id. at 151. The buyer had purchased the truck under a contract with a specific warranty 
provision relating to the risk of loss. Id. The California Supreme Court did not consider the possibility 
that warranty damages were appropriate on appeal because the trial court determined that the plaintiff 
could not prove the causation necessary to establish fault for warranty coverage. Id.  
 25. Roger J. Traynor served as the California Supreme Court’s Chief Justice from 1964–1970, 
after serving as an Associate Justice from 1940–1964. Justice Traynor was recognized not only as the 
greatest judge in the history of California courts, but also as one of the greatest in the history of the 
United States. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 688 (1985). Justice Traynor 
was so well respected in the legal community that he “was often called one of the greatest judicial 
talents never to sit on the United States Supreme Court.” Les Ledbetter, Roger J. Traynor, California 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1983, at B6. He is credited with developing the doctrine of strict 
liability, the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the “moderate and 
restrained interpretation” doctrine for resolving conflict-of-laws problems, and the rule that majority 
shareholders of closely held corporations have a duty to not destroy the value of minority shares. At 
the same time, Justice Traynor is credited with abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the 
defense of recrimination in the context of divorce. See J. Edward Johnson, Roger J. Traynor, in 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA: VOLUME II, 1900–1950, 182, 182 (J. 
Edward Johnson ed., 1966); G. Edward White, Introduction, in THE TRAYNOR READER: A 
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS BY THE HONORABLE ROGER J. TRAYNOR, (1987). See also Henry J. Friendly, 
Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1983). 
 26. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. Justice Traynor further explained that between a consumer and the 
manufacturer the consumer should be charged with the risk of commercial loss for the product’s 
performance. Id. The reasoning employed in the Seely opinion directly contradicted an opinion on the 
same topic handed down in the same year by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See D’Angelo, supra 
note 9, at 593. The New Jersey case, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965), 
found strict liability in a case where only the product was injured. Id. at 312–13. In Santor, the court 
reasoned that the responsibility of a manufacturer does not change regardless of whether the damage is 
limited to the articles sold or spreads to other consumer property. Id. at 312. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The reasoning used by Justice Traynor drew from both his own 
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.27—where he 
reasoned that a strict liability scheme was more efficient and fair than 
negligence when the manufacturer was in the best position to control risk 
and insure against loss28—and from the warranty provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which allow limitations to damages through 
warranty only in the case of commercial loss.29 Considering both of these 
principled rules of law, Justice Traynor concluded that warranty law and 
contract remedies should govern the economic relations between the 
parties unless the product caused “personal injury”30 or “physical injury to 
the plaintiff’s property.”31 While applying the rule in a strict liability 
context, he noted that a manufacturer’s liability should be limited in the 
same way for actions in negligence.32 Significantly, this case reached a 
decision that may have unfairly denied a remedy to an individual who 
suffered loss due to no fault of his own. But the overall social welfare and 
the preservation of warranty law for commercial transactions outweighed 
the reimbursement interests of the individual plaintiff.33 This policy 
preference underlies the categorical balancing in the cases that developed 
the economic loss doctrine. 
 
 
 27. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 28. Id. at 441 (“The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming 
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the 
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”). The reasoning used by 
Justice Traynor in this opinion has been cited throughout tort law as the persuasive rationale for 
upholding a strict liability scheme. PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 21, § 6.04. The 
California courts finally adopted strict products liability in Greenman v. Yuman Power Prods., Inc., 
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). Within two years the doctrine was promulgated by the American Law 
Institute in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Soon thereafter a majority of jurisdictions adopted the 
rationale. Id. Today, strict liability is the prevailing approach for product defect law. Id. 
 29. Seely, 403 P.2d at 152. Limitations to damages are prima facie unconscionable when 
personal injury is involved, but otherwise, parties are free to allocate the risk of loss through warranty 
and contract. Id. 
 30. Id. at 152. In cases of physical injury, the manufacturer can appropriately be held liable 
because of her responsibility to create products that do not create unreasonable harm. Id. at 151. 
 31. Id. at 152. To conclude that damage to a person’s property is equivalent to physical injury, 
Justice Traynor cited Prosser’s reconceptualization of tort law, entitled The Assault Upon the Citadel. 
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 
1099, 1143 (1960). This extension of tort principles simply concludes that if tort law is intended to 
ensure safety and social welfare, the pure chance that damage is caused to property rather than person 
is not a sound principle upon which to base differences in remedies. Seely, 403 P.2d at 149–50. Justice 
Traynor summed up the conclusion by simply saying, “Physical injury to property is so akin to 
personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing them.” Id. at 152. 
 32. Id. at 151 (“Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer’s liability is limited to damages 
for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone.”). 
 33. See id. at 151. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/4
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In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, sitting in maritime 
jurisdiction, adopted Traynor’s persuasive reasoning. In East River S.S. 
Corp. v. Transamerica Deleval, Inc.,34 a transport company sued a ship 
manufacturer when a design defect in a turbine engine caused damage to 
the rest of the turbine.35 After the lower federal courts dismissed the tort 
claims,36 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the economic loss doctrine 
presented the most efficient solution considering the policies at issue.37 
Justice Blackmun rejected ad hoc balancing tests because he reasoned such 
tests unjustifiably increased costs for the public.38 Furthermore, the Court 
dismissed theories that depended on how the property was damaged 
because tort law awards relief based on efficient social outcomes rather 
than the extent of the resulting loss.39 The Court concluded that “[w]hen a 
product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak 
and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong.”40 
 
 
 34. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
 35. Id. The shipbuilding company contracted with Transamerica “to design, manufacture, and 
supervise the installation of turbines” that would serve as the engines for new supertankers. Id. at 859. 
After completing the supertankers, the owner chartered each ship to the East River S.S. Corp., which 
took full responsibility for the ships and repairs for a period of twenty or twenty-two years. Id. at 860. 
It was soon found that the turbine engines had a faulty component that “caused additional damage to 
other parts of the turbine.” Id. The turbines were repaired by East River S.S. Corp., which 
subsequently brought suit against the turbine manufacturer seeking strict liability damages from the 
alleged design and manufacturing defects that caused the malfunction. Id. at 861–62.  
 36. East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903, 907–10 (3d Cir. 1985). The 
District Court granted summary judgment for the turbine manufacturer and the Third Circuit affirmed, 
holding that “damage to a defective product is actionable in tort unless the design defect creates an 
unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property other than the product itself.” Id. at 908. The Third 
Circuit added that disappointments over the product’s quality are protected by warranty law. Id. at 909. 
 37. East River, 476 U.S. at 868–70 (citing Seely, 403 P.2d 145). An easily determined rule was 
necessary for companies to structure their business activity. This consideration has weighed strongly 
toward the adoption and extension of the economic loss doctrine in a number of contexts.  
 38. Id. at 868–69 (discussing the minority position described in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 
Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965), for the proposition that “a manufacturer’s duty to make non-defective 
products encompassed injury to the product itself, whether or not the defect created an unreasonable 
risk of harm”). Blackmun also discussed an intermediate position followed by a number of 
jurisdictions that permitted tort actions for products liability under certain circumstances when a 
product injured only itself. Id. at 869. These courts allowed endangered users to recover in tort, while 
holding disappointed users to contract remedies. Id. at 870. Users were categorized as endangered or 
disappointed based on “the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury 
arose.” Id. at 870. See also Penn. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d 
Cir. 1981). Justice Blackmun found these minority and intermediate positions “unsatisfactory” because 
intermediate positions were “too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their 
business behavior,” and minority positions had less powerful arguments about theories for restricting 
products liability. East River, 476 U.S. at 870. 
 39. East River, 476 U.S. at 870. The Court explained that even in an accident-like event, the 
repairs, lost profits, and decreased value are “essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the 
benefit of its bargain . . . .” Id. 
 40. Id. at 871. 
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Thus, “the increased cost to the public that would result from holding a 
manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified.”41 
Significantly, Justice Blackmun discussed the scope of the economic 
loss doctrine by describing property that should be protected only by 
warranty law.42 Although a party may seek and recover damages for 
property as well as physical injury in a products liability claim,43 he 
concluded that the economic loss doctrine is properly applied in cases 
involving property damage unless the damage extends to “other 
property.”44 The Court reasoned, “Since all but the simplest machines 
have component parts a contrary holding would require a finding of 
‘property damage’ in virtually every case where a product damages itself. 
Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict 
products liability.”45 Thus, a plaintiff could obtain tort remedies if a 
product defect caused damage to “other property,” but expenses for 
repairs, lost profits, and decreased value to the product itself would be 
 
 
 41. Id. at 872. This quotation based its language on a comparison to the Second Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), which adopted the 
negligence standard and became the underlying reasoning for a dramatic change in tort law. 
 42. East River, 476 U.S. at 866–67. 
 43. This extension of products liability protection to personal property was based on the idea that 
“public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the 
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.” Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun again related 
this concept back to Seely, where Justice Traynor found, “Physical injury to property is so akin to 
personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing them.” Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 
145, 152 (Cal. 1965). 
 Extensions of product liability coverage to damage to property were widely accepted based on the 
idea that responsibility should attach whenever fixing responsibility could reduce hazards to life and 
health. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440. But cases supporting this proposition had previously only considered 
damage that went beyond the product sold. See East River, 752 F.2d at 867 (citing Marsh Wood 
Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 240 N.W. 392, 399 (Wis. 1932) and Genesee County Patrons 
Fire Relief Ass’n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 189 N.E. 551, 553–55 (N.Y. 1934)). 
 44. East River, 476 U.S. at 909–10. The Court found that the damage was not damage to “other 
property” because each turbine was supplied as an integrated package that could be properly regarded 
as a single unit. Id.  
 The line between property properly protected only by contractual remedies and “other property,” 
which should theoretically proscribe tort remedies, has proven difficult to define. Cases subsequent to 
East River debated how “other property” should be defined. See, e.g., KB Home v. Superior Court, 5 
Cal. Rptr. 3d, 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Jurisdictions around the country set different standards until 
the United States Supreme Court returned to the language of East River and defined “other property” 
as property outside of the scope of the original contract. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle, Inc., 
520 U.S. 875 (1997). For a more complete discussion of the “other property” exception, see infra notes 
50–60 and accompanying text. 
 45. East River, 476 U.S. at 867 (quoting N. Power & Eng’g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 
P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981)). This language has been often cited as one of the core concepts 
delineating the scope of the economic loss doctrine. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/4
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limited to remedies defined in the warranty.46 Although the Court’s 
decision in maritime jurisdiction was not mandatory authority for state tort 
law, this reasoning convinced almost all United States jurisdictions to 
adopt the economic loss doctrine as described by Justice Blackmun.47 
Some courts even reversed earlier rulings that had rejected the doctrine.48  
The persuasive reasoning developed by Justice Traynor and Justice 
Blackmun led to the doctrine’s immediate growth beyond products 
liability into situations not originally considered. Although the basic 
premise of the economic loss doctrine has been almost universally 
accepted,49 a number of these outgrowths and interpretations have 
confused the scope of the doctrine. Inconsistent exceptions have developed 
in its application to component parts, service contracts, and fraud claims. 
Each of these exceptions will be considered in turn. Part A will deal with 
the “other property” exception for component parts, Part B will consider 
exceptions for service contracts, and Part C will describe exceptions for 
fraud and misrepresentation. 
A. The “Other Property” Exception to Economic Loss 
One debate regarding the economic loss doctrine arises from the “other 
property” language that was used in East River.50 Some cases suggest that 
 
 
 46. Id. at 870. 
 47. D’Angelo, supra note 9, at 593. Because the United States Supreme Court sat in maritime 
jurisdiction in East River, Justice Blackmun’s opinion did not set precedent for any other jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, the respect for the Supreme Court and the reasoning employed by Justice Blackmun was 
enough to convince those courts not persuaded by Justice Traynor’s original explanation in Seely. Id. 
“[T]he rule took a giant step toward the nearly universal acceptance it now enjoys when the U.S. 
Supreme Court applied it in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.” Id. at 593. 
 48. See id. at 595–96. Some courts overruled previous court decisions while other jurisdictions 
enacted statutes to change the application of the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 595 (citing Casa Clara 
Condo. Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1982), which overruled Drexel 
Props., Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condo., Inc., 406 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). See also 
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.72.010(4), (6) (1992) (discarding the previous rule established in Berg v. 
General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1977)). 
 Despite being the leader of the conflicting minority approach, even New Jersey adopted an 
understanding of the economic loss doctrine that matches the reasoning of Seely and East River. 
D’Angelo, supra note 9, at 595–96. D’Angelo explains that New Jersey limited its approach, which 
held manufacturers liable for damage even to the product itself, to non-commercial transactions. Later 
the court held that the “Uniform Commercial Code provides a consumer buyer the exclusive remedy 
for direct economic loss resulting from conduct that constitutes the breach of express or implied 
warranties.” D’Angelo v. Miller Yacht Sales, 619 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
Thus, New Jersey eventually reached the same result as that endorsed by East River. D’Angelo, supra 
note 9, at 596.  
 49. D’Angelo, supra note 9, at 593. 
 50. Compare KB Home v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), with 
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 883 (1997). 
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if damage extends beyond the defective part, the economic loss doctrine is 
not applicable. For example, in KB Home v. Superior Court,51 a California 
appellate court held that when a component of a product injures another 
component of the product, the injured component is other property if it is 
“a sufficiently discrete element of the larger product that it is not 
reasonable to expect its failure invariably to damage other portions of the 
finished product.”52 While this holding can be read in a manner consistent 
 
 
 51. 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (Cal. App. 2003). KB Home sued a furnace manufacturer for the cost of 
repairing and replacing defective furnaces. Id. at 587. The furnace manufacturer supplied 
approximately 2200 furnaces for installation in homes built by KB Home. Id. at 590–91. As part of the 
contract, the furnace manufacturer equipped each furnace at issue with a NOx rod before selling them 
to KB Home in order to meet California air quality standards in certain metropolitan areas. Id. A defect 
in the NOx rods generated excess heat that damaged other parts of the furnaces, creating a “substantial 
risk of fire.” Id. at 590–92. Due to the risk caused by the defective furnaces and inaction on the part of 
the furnace manufacturer, KB Home replaced the defective and damaged furnaces at a cost of $3 
million before bringing suit against the furnace manufacturer. Id. at 591–92. 
 52. Id. at 596. To support this contention the court cited a California Supreme Court decision 
which said, “The concept of recoverable physical injury or property damage” has over time “expanded 
to include damage to one part of a product caused by another, defective part.” Id. at 595–96 (quoting 
Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 450, 457 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 
1125, 1130 (Cal. 2000)).  
 It seems that reliance on the language used in Jimenez was misplaced in the KB Home analysis. 
Jimenez concluded that a window manufacturer is still strictly liable when that window is incorporated 
into a larger, mass-produced product and the entire product is sold to a consumer. Jimenez, 58 P.3d at 
455. The conclusion reached in Jimenez was based on reasoning that the economic loss doctrine does 
not expand beyond the product created just because it is incorporated into a larger product by another 
party. Id. at 456–57. Seen from this perspective, the quote used in KB Home about the limitations of 
the Jimenez holding suggests that there may be times when the economic loss doctrine extends 
contract remedies and precludes tort remedies beyond the scope of the product produced. Rather than 
suggesting an expansion to the scope of torts, the line used by the court in KB Home suggests that 
there may be instances where the scope of torts is further limited due to the economic loss doctrine and 
the policy preference for contract remedies.  
 Additionally, KB Home makes the determination that “other property” should be interpreted 
expansively based on the idea that Jimenez “did not provide any direct guidance as to how that crucial 
evaluation was to be made . . . .” KB Home, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 595. Although Jimenez does not give 
specific direction as to how to determine the defining line between the product itself and other 
property, this is because the boundaries were not an issue. In Jimenez the windows were “designed, 
developed, manufactured, produced, supplied, and placed into the stream of commerce” by the 
window manufacturer. Jimenez, 58 P.3d at 452. This language, when considered along with California 
cases delineating between contract and tort, suggests that “other product” refers to property not 
considered within the agreement.  
 In the end, the California Supreme Court’s emphasis on duty and breach independent of the 
contract, the isolation of social policy from the “mini-universe” of contract, and the goals considered 
in the economic loss doctrine suggests that the California Supreme Court would adopt an approach 
similar to that adopted by the United States Supreme Court, not the approach suggested in KB Home. 
Although the KB Home interpretation is arguably a misapplication of the economic loss rule, the 
determination has been used by plaintiffs’ attorneys to defeat dismissal as a matter of law and 
undermine the effectiveness and purpose of the economic loss rule. See, e.g., Croman Corp. v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., No. 2:05-CV-0575-GEB-JFM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39408, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 
2005). 
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with other California authority,53 may be based on misinterpretations of 
previous case law,54 and possibly has been limited by later cases,55 it 
indicates that courts are still attempting to clearly define “other 
property.”56  
 
 
 53. KB Home, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590–92. The decision could be read to suggest that the 
component in question was a separate item from the contracted property because the component was 
“an after-market add-on . . . .” Id. In this case the damage would be other property according to the 
majority interpretation of the doctrine. 
 54. KB Home cites Jimenez to support the proposition that whether the damage is caused to other 
property is a matter for the trier of fact to determine; but the passage cited does not consider who is to 
determine the nature of the product. Compare KB Home, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590, with Jimenez, 58 P.3d 
at 456–57. In fact, the passage in Jimenez cited by KB Home considers two situations in which 
decisions as to whether “other property” is damaged as a matter of law arise. Jimenez, 58 P.3d at 456–
57. The passage explains that, in Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Cal. 2000), the trial court 
barred the introduction of evidence that had not caused injury, and the California Supreme Court 
upheld this decision. Jimenez, 58 P.3d at 456. The Jimenez court then used California decisional law to 
support its conclusion that installing a product into a home does not eliminate the product 
manufacturer’s strict product liability. Id. at 457. Contrary to the conclusion in KB Home, both of the 
examples represent instances of a judicial decision about what constitutes a product as a matter of law. 
 Determining what constitutes a product as a matter of law conforms to the California Supreme 
Court’s direction that “[w]hether a defendant owes a duty of care is a question of law.” Erlich v. 
Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 983–84 (Cal. 1990) (quoting Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 
(Cal. 1992)). When the damaged item is “other than the product itself,” a party has a duty to not cause 
harm under tort law. See Jimenez, 58 P.3d at 456–57. On the other hand, when the damaged item is 
part of the defective product, the contracting party owes no such duty outside of contract provisions. 
Id. Thus, the nature of the product is necessarily a determination of whether a defendant owes a duty 
of care, which is a question of law. Moreover, the nature of the product at hand must be a question of 
law because the distinction defines the line between tort and contract law under the economic loss 
doctrine. The court or the legislature, not a jury or trier of fact, must ultimately decide the boundaries 
between tort and contract law. Thus, KB Home misuses the language of Jimenez to support a 
proposition contrary to California law. 
 55. See supra note 52. The potential reach of KB Home may have been subsequently eliminated 
by the California Supreme Court’s re-explanation of the economic loss doctrine in Robinson 
Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004). Although Robinson Helicopter does not 
address the exact issue decided in KB Home, it can be read to contradict the holding and may have 
been motivated by the misinterpretations. Id. 
 56. The only reported case to have cited KB Home is Croman Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
39408 at *5. The Croman Corp. decision denied a motion to dismiss based on the proposition that 
whether damaged property is other property is a matter of fact to be decided at trial. Although KB 
Home directly supports this outcome, this conclusion conflicts with the theory underlying the 
economic loss doctrine and undermines the ability of product manufacturers to rely on contract. 
 Furthermore, the conclusion relies in part on a minority opinion. In Jimenez, 38 P.3d at 458–59, 
Justice Kennard’s concurring opinion argued that the scope of the economic loss doctrine should be 
based on whether a product is  
so integrated into the larger unit as to have lost its separate identity. If so, strict liability is 
improper. But if the component retains its separate identity, so that it may be readily 
separated from the overall unit, the component manufacturer may be strictly liable for 
damages to the larger unit. 
Id. at 459. Justice Kennard argued that this standard was in line with both the standard set by the 
United States Supreme Court in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997), 
and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability. Jimenez, 58 P.3d at 458–59. 
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Recently, in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.,57 the United 
States Supreme Court provided its own analysis of the distinction between 
“the product itself” and “other property” by defining a product as the item 
placed in the stream of commerce by the manufacturer and distributors. In 
Saratoga Fishing, a second-hand boat owner claimed tort damages when 
the boat’s original hydraulic system failed, sinking the boat and causing 
damage to items installed by the first owner.58 In an opinion written by 
Justice Breyer, the Court held that the second-hand boat owner could 
recover in tort for damages to products added by the initial owner.59 The 
Court reasoned that “initial users . . . typically depend upon, and likely 
seek warranties that depend upon, a manufacturer’s primary business skill, 
namely, the assembly of workable product components into a marketable 
whole.”60 Under this reasoning, contract remedies should cover all 
damages caused by goods acquired under the contract and tort remedies 
should only apply to items not contemplated in the contract. Plaintiffs 
would be left to their warranty rights or rights against the manufacturer of 
the component part.  
B. The Service Contract Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine 
Another recent outgrowth that has sparked controversy about the 
boundaries of the economic loss doctrine is its application to service 
contracts.61 Traditionally, the economic loss doctrine is a “goods” doctrine 
because it grew out of products liability law and was based partially on the 
 
 
 Justice Kennard’s explanation did not consider differences in the doctrine based on the party 
subject to the suit. Id. In Jimenez, the suit was brought against the component part manufacturer whose 
product injured the whole, but in Saratoga Fishing, the plaintiff sued the seller of the whole product. 
Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 877–78. This difference may better explain the difference in reasoning 
behind the outcomes than an approach based on whether the product was part of the integrated whole.  
 57. 520 U.S. 875, 883 (1997). Just as in East River, the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court was not binding on other jurisdictions because the court sat in maritime jurisdiction. 
 58. Id. at 877. J.M. Martinac & Co. constructed a ship and sold it to its initial owner. Id. The first 
owner added equipment and parts, and used the ship for tuna fishing. Id. The owner then sold the ship 
to the Saratoga Fishing Company, and Saratoga continued to use the ship for fishing. Id. About fifteen 
years after the initial sale, a defect in the hydraulic system, installed during original construction by 
J.M. Martinac, caused an engine-room fire that led to the sinking of the ship. Id. The Saratoga Fishing 
Company filed an action in admiralty, and the trial court awarded tort damages for the destruction of 
property added by the initial user. Id. at 877–78. The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision, finding that 
even the property added to the ship was part of the product; thus, tort damages could not be recovered 
under the economic loss doctrine. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th 
Cir. 1995), cert. granted Martinac, 519 U.S. 926 (1996).  
 59. Saratoga Fishing, 520 U.S. at 875. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Rapaport et al., supra note 19, at 100. 
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assumptions and remedies available under the UCC.62 Nonetheless, the 
underlying policy convinced some courts to extend the doctrine’s 
reasoning to service contracts. Although the supreme courts of Illinois,63 
Utah,64 Ohio,65 Washington,66 Rhode Island,67 Colorado,68 and Virginia69 
have approved of the use of the economic loss doctrine in service 
contracts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently rejected this approach.70 
The Utah Supreme Court explained that the economic loss rule is 
appropriate for service contracts because tort law does not impose 
standards on the performance of contracts.71 Rather, tort law is concerned 
only with safety of products and actions.72 Parties need to be able to 
allocate risk through contract, or tort law would result in “liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class.”73 These rationales become particularly important where detailed 
and comprehensive contracts are the core of an industry,74 or when there 
are tangible elements to the contract that can be studied by the parties.75 
According to this logic, a provider of services has an important interest in 
being able to establish the terms of a relationship with a client;76 therefore, 
 
 
 62. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 2004). 
 63. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1200–01 (Ill. 1997). 
 64. Am. Towers Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1996). 
 65. Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmt’y Gen. Hosp. Ass’n, 560 N.E.2d 206, 212 
(Ohio 1990). 
 66. Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994). 
 67. Boston Inv. Prop. No. 1 v. E.W. Burman, Inc., 658 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1995). 
 68. Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Col. 2000). 
 69. Blake Const. Co., Inc. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. 1987). 
 70. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 2004). The service contract 
debate has been most relevant in dealing with construction contracts. See Kevin J. Breer & Justin D. 
Pulikkan, The Economic Loss Rule in Kansas and its Impact on Construction Cases, 74 J. KAN. B.A. 
30 (2005). 
 71. Am. Towers Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1996). In 
American Towers Owners Ass’n, the court granted summary judgment to a mechanical subcontractor 
under the economic loss doctrine when a condominium association brought suit for alleged design 
defects in the construction of the condominium building. Id. at 1184–85. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
 74. Id. This is true in the construction industry where contracting parties structure their 
relationships in order to meet individual expectations. Anthony Meagher & Michael O’Day, Who is 
Going to Pay for My Impact? A Contractor’s Ability to Sue Third Parties for Purely Economic Loss, 
CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2005, at 27, 28–30. 
 75. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1200–01 (Ill. 1997). 
 76. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Childs, 52 F. Supp. 2d 139, 145 (D. Me. 2004). In Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co., the district court reiterated the important interests of a service provider and paralleled 
these to the interests of parties involved in a contract for goods. The case facts surrounded a storm that 
caused severe water damage in a hotel, resulting in the owner losing use of the property. Id. at 141. 
The plaintiff insurance company paid $200,000 for the damages, but then brought a subrogation action 
against the builder of the hotel. Id. at 140–41. The complaint alleged that the builder negligently 
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a service provider should be able to define duties and risks in contract to 
predict the cost of doing business.77  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically addressed and rejected this 
approach in Insurance Co. of North America v. Cease Electric Inc.78 In 
Cease Electric, an insurance company sued an electric company in tort for 
improperly installing a ventilation system in an insured’s barn.79 The court 
examined the split of authority on the issue, along with the policy 
underlying the doctrine, and found that the doctrine should not apply to 
 
 
constructed the masonry façade and weep holes so that drainage water did not have adequate paths 
during foreseeable weather conditions, failed to train employees during the construction of the 
building, and did not warn the plaintiff insurance company of the condition. Id. at 141. The defendant 
builder moved to dismiss the action under the economic loss doctrine, and the plaintiff opposed, 
arguing that the doctrine did not apply to service contracts. Id. at 141–42.  
 The arguments were submitted in dicta because, as a matter of first impression that would decide a 
diversity case, the presiding judge certified a question as to whether Maine law would apply the 
economic loss doctrine in the service contract context. Rapaport et al., supra note 19, at 102. Despite 
deferring the decision to the state court, Judge Carter, a senior district judge who previously served as 
an associate justice for the Maine Supreme Court, constructed persuasive arguments for the application 
of the economic loss doctrine in such situations. Id. 
 77. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d at 145. 
 78. 688 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Wis. 2004). 
 79. Id. The barn owner raised chickens to produce eggs. In order to decrease costs, the barn 
owner purchased an upgraded ventilation system for his barn. The ventilation system was needed to 
bring fresh air and oxygen into the barn to keep the chickens alive. Id. The new system replaced a 
manual ventilation system, which operated numerous individual fans with their own thermostats, with 
a computer-controlled unit designed to operate all fans in stages according to a single temperature 
measurement. Id. at 465.  
 After purchasing the control unit from a third party, the barn owner contracted with an electric 
company to install the new system. Id. The job included wiring the primary fan control and the backup 
thermostat, a safety device designed by the product manufacturer to take over in the event that the 
primary fan control failed. Id. A schematic provided by the manufacturer recommended that the 
backup thermostat be wired to a separate power source in case the first power source failed. About half 
a year after the new system was installed the ventilation systems failed, causing damage for loss of the 
chickens and for the loss of income. Id.  
 The insurance company paid the barn owner $40,704.89 for the chickens and $118,339.20 for the 
loss of income and then brought an action against the electric company alleging that the ventilation 
system failure was due to the company’s negligence in performance of services. Id. In an investigation 
of the system malfunction conducted less than a week after the loss, the independent investigator 
concluded that the system had been improperly wired because the main fan control unit was on the 
same power circuit as the backup thermostat. Id. He also concluded that the electric company failed to 
test the new system and that a test would have revealed that the backup thermostat was not 
functioning. Id. 
 Following a jury trial, the trial court found that the electric company was negligent and entered 
judgment for the amount of damages plus double costs according to Wisconsin statute. Id. On appeal, 
the electric company argued that the economic loss doctrine precluded the negligence action because 
they had provided a product to the barn owner and the loss was only one of disappointed expectations. 
Id. at 465–66. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court judgment holding that the electric company 
had provided only services and that the economic loss doctrine did not apply to service contracts. Id. at 
466.  
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service contracts.80 The court noted that the doctrine was not historically 
designed for service contracts, and it reasoned that the doctrine should not 
be extended because the UCC, which does not apply to service contracts, 
“serves as one of the critical rationales underlying the economic loss 
doctrine.”81 Because service contracts lack well-developed remedies, 
rights, and guarantees, the Court found that tort law was better suited for 
dealing with economic loss in service contracts than contract law.82  
C. The Application of Economic Loss to Fraud and Negligent 
Misrepresentation Claims 
Another recent confusion regarding the scope of the economic loss 
doctrine centers on the application of the doctrine to fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims. In this area, courts again have struggled to find a 
consistent and universal application of the doctrine.83 The disparate 
treatment of the economic loss doctrine in fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation cases is best exemplified by the variety of results 
individual jurisdictions have reached in fire-retardant-treated plywood 
(FRT) cases.84 In each of these cases, the defendant’s claim that the 
economic loss doctrine barred tort recovery conflicted with the plaintiffs’ 
claims that fraud and negligent misrepresentation overcame this 
limitation.85 When faced with this conflict, Maryland courts dismissed 
negligent misrepresentation claims,86 Michigan courts dismissed fraud 
 
 
 80. Id. at 467 (“There is a split among the jurisdictions as to whether the economic loss doctrine 
applies to contracts for services.”). For a further discussion of the split of authority see PHILIP L. 
BRUNNER AND PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 19:10, 
n.14 (2004). 
 81. Cease Elec., 688 N.W.2d at 469. Under the UCC, manufacturers have a right to restrict 
liability and disclaim warranties. Id. For contracts involving goods, the court recognized that if the 
economic loss doctrine did not preclude tort and limit purchasers to contract damages, the UCC 
provisions governing disputes would be completely circumvented and rendered meaningless. Id. 
 82. Id. at 469–70.  
 83. R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to 
Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2000). See also 
All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting the various 
applications of the economic loss rule to misrepresentation claims).  
 84. Barton, supra note 83, at 1790. Four jurisdictions have reached verdicts in cases involving 
fire-retardant-treated plywood roofs. Id. at 1791. After learning of defects to the FRT plywood, 
manufacturers continued to sell the material without notifying purchasers. Id. at 1790. Roofs made 
with the material deteriorated, and homeowners and builders sued to recover the cost of repairing or 
replacing the roofs. Id. at 1791. Plaintiffs who suffered losses due to defects in the FRT plywood 
brought actions claiming fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and defendants claimed protection 
from tort remedies because the damage was only economic loss. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 639 A.2d 624, 631 (Md. 1995) (involving a 
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claims,87 Florida courts allowed negligent misrepresentation and fraud 
claims,88 and Virginia courts allowed fraud claims while barring negligent 
misrepresentation claims.89  
Outside of the FRT plywood context, courts have developed three main 
approaches to deal with conflicts between the economic loss doctrine and 
allegations of fraud or negligent misrepresentation.90 The first approach 
treats fraud as an exception to the economic loss doctrine because (1) 
fraud claims rest on a defendant’s conduct rather than the underlying 
contract, which makes the nature of the injury irrelevant;91 (2) tort law 
historically imposes an independent duty to refrain from fraudulently 
inducing contract;92 and (3) the measure of damages for fraud is the “loss 
of the bargain,” which is based on purely economic expectations.93 The 
second approach grants no exception to the economic loss doctrine for 
fraud because the doctrine bars from tort purely economic damages.94 The 
third approach determines whether to impose a tort duty based on 
 
 
homeowner’s claim to recover for necessary roof repairs). Maryland law would have allowed tort 
recovery under the “other property” exception if the roof had caused damage to other parts of the 
home. Barton, supra note 83, at 1791. 
 87. Citizens Ins. Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 585 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998) (finding remedies under the UCC exclusive). 
 88. Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(finding that the plaintiff failed to prove misrepresentation claims even though they were not barred by 
the economic loss doctrine). 
 89. See Barton, supra note 83, at 1792. The unsuccessful nature of the negligent 
misrepresentation claims may explain the apparent contradictions in application. The Maryland and 
Michigan courts may have used the economic loss doctrine as a gatekeeper against the negligent 
misrepresentation claims because they perceived the claims as meritless.  
 90. See id. at 1803–12. 
 91. Kahn v. Shiley, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that fraud 
remedies include purely economic losses because the type of damage is not considered in fraud). 
 92. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc., v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004) (holding that fraud 
and misrepresentation claims were independent of the contract breach and that tort damages were 
appropriate for such an independent duty). See also Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & 
Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. 1998) (finding that the economic loss doctrine did not limit 
damages based on duties “separate and independent from the duties established by the contract itself”). 
 93. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 453. If the measure of damages 
is based purely on economic expectations, then application of the economic loss doctrine would 
eliminate all damages. The economic loss doctrine would eliminate fraud as a cause of action in 
contract-related cases. Since the economic loss doctrine could not have been intended to eliminate 
fraud as a cause of action, fraud must be an exception to the rule. 
 94. Barton, supra note 83, at 1811–12. Although Barton also recognizes an intermediate 
approach adopted by the Michigan courts that excepts fraud from the economic loss doctrine if the 
defendant’s misrepresentations do not concern the matter of the contract, he recognizes that “the 
practical effect of the additional requirement has rendered the exception a nullity.” Id. at 1808. 
 Additionally, Florida courts seem to apply the economic loss doctrine to fraudulent inducement 
claims on a case-by-case basis because there is a lack of clarity in the economic loss rule. Id. at 1808–
10. See also Force v. ITT Hardford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(applying Florida law).  
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apportioning risk according to the supply of information before 
contracting.95 In this case, the court will separately analyze the 
relationship between parties and determine if the party supplying 
information assumed the duty to provide accurate information. If such a 
duty existed, the court will allow tort remedies.96 In all, courts are far from 
reaching a universal approach to the conflict between the economic loss 
doctrine and fraud or negligent misrepresentation claims.  
Most recently, the California Supreme Court attempted to explain its 
interpretation of the economic loss doctrine while dealing with claims of 
fraud and misrepresentation in Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana 
Corp.97 In Robinson Helicopter, the court held that fraud and 
 
 
 95. Barton, supra note 83, at 1813–23. This approach mimics the contract interpretation 
approach of reading into the contract what the parties would have done if they were provided perfect 
information.  
 96. Id. at 1816–19. See also Congregation of the Passion v. Touche, Ross & Co., 636 N.E.2d 
503, 515 (Ill. 1994). This approach is based on the concept that the law imposes a legal obligation on 
those in positions to supply information that will be reasonably relied on by contracting parties. Justice 
Cardozo described this approach in Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275–76 (N.Y. 1922). Barton, 
supra note 83, at 1813–14. The result of this approach is an ad hoc balancing test in cases where the 
economic loss doctrine and allegations of fraud or negligent misrepresentation conflict. 
 97. 102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004). In Robinson Helicopter, a helicopter manufacturer contracted with 
a subcontractor for the production of a safety component called the sprag clutch, which allows the 
rotor to continue turning and the pilot to maintain control if the helicopter loses power during flight. 
Id. at 270. The contract was subject to Federal Aviation Administration guidelines that do not allow 
changes to the design of an aircraft from the issued “type certificate” without approval from the FAA. 
Id.  
 The contract and FAA “type certificate” required the sprag clutches to be ground at a specific 
level of hardness described as “50/55 Rockwell.” Id. at 270–71. For a period of twelve years, 
Robinson Helicopter purchased 3707 sprag clutches at this level of hardness and experienced cracking 
in only three clutches, a 0.03% failure rate. Id. at 271. Then, without notifying Robinson Helicopter or 
the FAA, the sprag clutch manufacturer changed the clutches to “61/63 Rockwell,” a higher level of 
hardness. Id. Pursuant to the contract, the sprag clutch manufacturer continued to provide written 
certificates that the clutches had been manufactured to Robinson Helicopter’s standards. Id. During the 
short period that the clutches were manufactured at the 61/63 level, Robinson Helicopter experienced a 
failure rate of 9.86%. Id. Fortunately, the clutch failures did not cause any injury or damage to other 
property, but, after learning of the change in hardness, Robinson Helicopter was required to recall and 
replace all 990 of the clutch assemblies that employed the harder level. Id. 
 Attempts to identify the defective clutches for replacement were delayed when the manufacturer 
of the clutches refused to provide the necessary serial and lot numbers for the parts until more than two 
months after the initial request. Id. Since the manufacturer was the only company equipped to make 
the piece on short notice, Robinson Helicopter submitted an order for the required replacements and 
requested that the cost be left for a later determination. Id. The sprag clutch manufacturer denied any 
wrongdoing and only delivered the parts on a COD basis. Id. Without any other alternative, Robinson 
Helicopter replaced the sprag clutches on their own at a cost of $1,555,924 and then brought suit. Id.  
 Robinson Helicopter claimed breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligent and intentional 
misrepresentations. Id. at 272. At the trial court level, a jury returned a verdict granting full 
compensatory damages to Robinson Helicopter based on the breach of contract along with a $6 million 
punitive damage award for the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Id. The court of appeals affirmed 
the compensatory damage finding but, based on the economic loss doctrine, ruled that tort damages 
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misrepresentation claims were independent of the contract breach and that 
tort damages—in this case the punitive award—were appropriate for such 
an independent duty.98 The California Supreme Court cited its previous 
decisions in Jimenez v. Superior Court,99 Aas v. Superior Court,100 and 
Erlich v. Menezes101 as support for the contention that “[c]onduct 
amounting to a breach of contract becomes tortious only when it also 
violates a duty independent of the contract arising from the principles of 
tort law.”102  
The decision in Robinson Helicopter continued the California Supreme 
Court’s attempt to clarify the economic loss doctrine and to define when 
tort remedies would be available despite an underlying contract.103 
Although the Court did not give a specific definition for which duties are 
independent of contracts, it gave content to the distinction with examples 
of both non-independent and independent duties.104 The court found that 
 
 
were inappropriate, reversing the punitive damages. Id. 
 98. Id. at 272–73. 
 99. 58 P.3d 450 (Cal. 2002). In Jimenez, the California Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff could 
maintain a strict liability action against a window manufacturer for damage to the rest of the house 
caused by defective windows. Id. at 457. The court gave content to the “other property” exception. See 
supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text. 
 100. 12 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2000) (applying the economic loss rule to negligent action in a home 
construction contract). 
 101. 981 P.2d 978 (Cal. 1999). In Erlich, the California Supreme Court held that emotional 
distress tort damages were not available for the negligent breach of a home construction contract. Id. at 
979. 
 102. Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 273. 
 103. The California Supreme Court had previously dealt with these issues. See Jimenez, 58 P.3d 
450 (providing content to the “other property” exception in a strict products liability context); Aas, 12 
P.3d 1125 (applying the economic loss rule to negligent action in a home construction contract); 
Erlich, 981 P.2d 978 (holding that emotional distress tort damages were not available for the negligent 
breach of a home construction contract); Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
420, 433 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that, in order to apply tort law to a contractual 
relationship the risk and social benefit must overcome the contract policy considerations which 
strongly favor denying tort recovery); Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 28 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 475, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that for a breach of contract to become tortious the action 
must violate an independent duty arising from principles of tort law). 
 104. Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 273. After specifically identifying three situations where 
breach of contract could entail the breach of independent tort duties, the court mentioned that 
“[f]ocusing on intentional conduct gives substance to the proposition that a breach of contract is 
tortious only when some independent duty arising from tort law is violated.” But see Arledge, supra 
note 6. Arledge countered that Robinson Helicopter failed to “articulate[] a coherent test for 
determining whether a tort is independent or not.” Id. at 25. Although Arledge argues persuasively 
using language that the court used to describe why intentional misrepresentation claims are 
independent, his analysis fails to recognize that previous case law gives a great deal of content to the 
definition of “independent tort duties.”  
 Arledge compares the assertions of the California Supreme Court in Robinson Helicopter to 
possible arguments by a plaintiff trying to evade the economic loss rule based on a negligent breach of 
contract. Id. at 25. But, considering the previous decision of the California Supreme Court in Erlich, 
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tort damages were appropriate when the breach causes physical injury, 
when an insurance contract breaches the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and when the contract was fraudulently induced.105 On the other 
hand, the court approved case law that did not allow tort damages for 
negligent breach of contract because, if every negligent breach of a 
contract gave rise to tort damages, the limitation provided by the economic 
loss doctrine as well as the distinction between tort and contract law would 
be meaningless.106 In the end, the court concluded that if a contract 
establishes the relationships of the parties, tort remedies are only available 
if the breach of contract is accompanied by a tort, accomplished in a 
tortious manner, or intentionally committed in a manner that will 
knowingly cause severe harm.107 According to this approach, fraud is an 
independent tort that gives rise to tort remedies. 
III. ANALYSIS  
The economic loss doctrine developed alongside strict liability law 
under the direction of the same well-respected judge;108 therefore, the 
parallel growth lends insight into its application in problematic areas. The 
comparison reveals that loss compensation interests are secondary to the 
freedom to contract until tort law intervention is needed to deter an 
equilibrium of inefficient conduct. Furthermore, the comparison highlights 
the idea that tort law can serve as insurance that is passed along to 
customers as a cost of doing business,109 but passing on this cost must be 
balanced against the value of allowing individuals the freedom to 
contract.110 In the end, if we are to fully accept the role of tort and contract 
 
 
which Robinson Helicopter cites approvingly, it is clear that negligent breach of contract does not fit 
within the category of “independent tort duties.” Although the Court did not lay down a hard and fast 
rule for determining which tort duties are independent of contractual relationships, the boundaries of 
this category can be ascertained from previous case law and the examples used in Robinson 
Helicopter.  
 105. Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 273. These conclusions were based on the determinations 
reached in prior California Supreme Court decisions. 
 106. Id. at 273–74. 
 107. Id. “[T]ortious breach of contract . . . may be found when (1) the breach is accompanied by a 
traditional common law tort, such as fraud or conversion; (2) the means used to breach the contract are 
tortious, involving deceit or undue coercion; or (3) one party intentionally breaches the contract 
intending or knowing that such a breach will cause severe, unmitigable harm in the form of mental 
anguish, personal hardship, or substantial consequential damages.” Id. 
 108. See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text.  
 109. See supra note 28. 
 110. The law of contracts “attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have been 
induced by the making of a promise.” 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1993). 
Furthermore,  
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law in providing a default structure and an ability to structure relationships 
for the most efficient commercial interactions, the economic loss doctrine 
must pay heed to the concepts of efficient breach111 and bounded 
rationality.112  
Seen as a balance between the conflicting standards of tort and 
contract, the economic loss doctrine, then, must deny tort remedies with 
respect to all elements that were or should have been considered in the 
bargaining process. Contract law must govern any element built into the 
cost of the agreement, such as the reputation of the supplier and the risk 
allocation between parties for potential loss. Otherwise, there is a 
disincentive to contract between parties because the individual value set 
during the bargaining process could be set aside in court. Additionally, the 
law must be steadfast in its protection of contract rights113 as long as there 
is no socially recognized reason for voiding the contractual agreement.114 
When bounded rationality suggests that an outcome is beyond the scope of 
the contractual agreement, tort law should not impose a duty to protect the 
other party’s business interests even if these business interests involve 
potentially risky uses of products or services. 
 
 
[a]greements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made 
the basis for action. When business agreements are not only made but are also acted on, the 
division of labor is facilitated, goods find their way to the places where they are most needed, 
and economic activity is generally stimulated. 
Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 
59–62 (1936). Because of these interests, there is a high value placed on enforcing the will of parties 
as outlined in contracts. For this reason, tort law serves as a default rule in our society. When the 
relationship between two parties is outlined in a contract, tort remedies are unavailable unless the 
contract is unenforceable. 
 111. The concept of efficient breach suggests that a rational actor will not perform contract 
obligations when the costs of performance exceed the benefits to all parties. By enforcing contract 
remedies, the law encourages efficient breach and reaches the outcome with greatest societal value. 
See Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877 (1990); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 
552–55 (1980); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and 
Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (1993). 
 112. The concept of bounded rationality suggests that there is a limit to the concepts and possible 
situations that we can consider when forming a contract due to a finite limit to our cognitive abilities. 
See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 
(1998). 
 113. The goals and purposes of law and government can be best met “by establishing a judicial 
and administrative system that acts with a reasonable degree of uniformity.” 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 1.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1993). 
 114. Misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence are the three most common reasons to set 
aside a contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164, 175, 177 (1981). Other reasons that 
contracts are voidable or unenforceable include abuse of a fiduciary relationship, restraint of trade, 
impairment of family relations, contractual interference, and impracticability. See id. §§ 173, 186–91, 
194, 261, 266. 
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In order to serve its role as a limit to tort remedies when the underlying 
relationship between parties is established by contract, a proper 
application of the doctrine should also consider whether a categorical or 
ad hoc balancing test should be used to define its scope.115 Based on the 
initial reasoning of Justice Blackmun,116 categorical balancing seems more 
appropriate. Furthermore, if the economic loss doctrine functions as a 
default rule when parties have a contractual relationship, employing the 
economic loss doctrine on a categorical basis is the only method that 
preserves the general tort rule of not transferring losses unless social 
policy demands it.117 Often this consideration differentiates between the 
individual consumer and the commercial business because sophisticated 
parties are more likely to consider risk of loss in warranty provisions.118 
But the law must be careful not to limit the contractual power of 
individuals operating outside the commercial context. For these reasons, a 
categorical rule that provides default terms to contractual relationships 
seems to provide the best method of balancing the social consequences 
and contractual rights involved. The only question then is where to draw 
the categorical line. 
A. The “Other Property” Exception to Economic Loss 
Under the economic loss doctrine, at least two viable definitions of 
“other property” currently exist. Under the system endorsed by the United 
 
 
 115. A categorical approach may define groups that are both under- and over-inclusive, but this 
failure to reach an ideal result in individual cases is preferred because of the predictability of the rule. 
Although an ad hoc approach allows the court to reach the correct result in each individual case, the 
cost to society of finding this may make the categorical approach more efficient over the long term. 
The determination of which approach creates a better social standard is determined by how accurate 
categories of conduct can be defined and an evaluation of the cost of over- and under-inclusion. 
 116. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun found that rules requiring 
judicial determinations on a case-to-case basis were “too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily 
to structure their business behavior.” East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 
858, 870 (1985).  
 117. An ad hoc balancing rule would force sellers of goods and services to predict the potential 
problems of their customers and insert specific wording into contracts to deal with these issues because 
the sellers, as potential defendants, would need to provide language that demonstrated that the risk of 
each specific loss was considered in this specific basis. Unlike in strict products liability, the purchaser 
and potential plaintiff is the party in the best condition to know the risk of loss in a contractual 
arrangement.  
 118. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 272 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that 
the economic loss doctrine “hinges on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of 
goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations are protected by commercial and 
contract law, and those involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are 
injured in a manner which has traditionally been remedied by resort to the law of torts” (quoting 
Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992))). 
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States Supreme Court in Saratoga Fishing,119 manufacturers and 
component suppliers can allocate potential liability for a product that does 
not work. Thus, the buyer can depend on or obtain warranties for the 
whole product purchased, and “component suppliers have appropriate 
incentives to prevent component defects that might destroy the 
product.”120 In that case, economic loss limitations protect the 
manufacturer only from liability concerning the product that they inject 
into the stream of commerce.121 According to the United States Supreme 
Court, the product itself is defined by the original contract for sale.122  
The other possible rule for “other property” is to allow tort damages 
when one component of a product injures another component that is 
sufficiently discrete from the component causing harm.123 If a law defined 
“other property” in this way, courts would be given the role of interpreting 
what is sufficiently discrete. Such a determination would require a hearing 
as to the facts surrounding the component and how it is integrated into the 
whole. Furthermore, case law would need to develop a judiciable standard 
for the meaning of sufficiently discrete.  
The contrast between these two approaches is similar to the debate 
between categorical and ad hoc balancing tests. Although ultimate justice 
on the individual level is best served by balancing the facts in each 
individual case, the law is sometimes better served on a macro level by 
making decisions based on well-defined categories. The developmental 
arguments presented by Justices Traynor and Blackmun suggest that the 
goals of the economic loss doctrine are better served by a rule that does 
not require litigation over case-specific facts. Furthermore, applying the 
economic loss doctrine in an ad hoc fashion fails to recognize the value of 
a supplier’s expertise in assembling all of the components of a system.124 
 
 
 119. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 883 (1997). The United States 
Supreme Court defined the product itself as the product injected into the stream of commerce by the 
original manufacturer. See supra note 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 120. Id. at 884. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. This conclusion squares with the idea that the economic loss doctrine is the boundary 
between contract and tort law. Regardless, some jurisdictions have concluded that the product is 
defined by the most recent sale rather than the original sale. See Sullivan v. Young Bros. & Co., Inc., 
91 F.3d 242, 249–50 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that under Maine law a secondary purchaser would likely 
have a claim against the seller of the product). 
 123. See supra note 51–54 and accompanying text. KB Home established that component-to-
component damage could justify tort damages if a component damaged another component that was “a 
sufficiently discrete element of the larger product that it is not reasonable to expect its failure 
invariably to damage other portions of the finished product.” KB Home v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 587, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  
 124. Supra note 57–60 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, individual fact-specific determinations, such as those required by 
defining “other property” as suggested in KB Home,125 are inefficient. A 
definition of “other property” that allows tort recovery for component-to-
component damage expands an exception to the point that it swallows the 
underlying purpose of the law. 
B. The Service Contract Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine 
There are two major arguments against applying the economic loss 
doctrine to service contracts. First, applying the doctrine to limit remedies 
is discouraged by the fact that many service contracts are oral. Second, 
there is no equivalent to the Universal Commercial Code for the 
interactions of parties in a service industry. On the other hand, service 
providers argue that the economic loss doctrine should be applied because 
they need some protection to ensure that they can properly predict the cost 
of their actions.  
Cease Electric categorically eliminated service contracts from the 
protection of the economic loss doctrine,126 but such an approach may not 
achieve the most efficient result on the macro level. Although limiting the 
application of the economic loss doctrine to contracts for goods may force 
a service provider to disclose potential risks that are not apparent to the 
customer, this approach seems to misallocate the risk of loss in a 
contractual situation where the customer better understands how the 
service performed will affect his business. Under this arrangement, a 
service provider will be held responsible for damages to the business of 
the recipient that result from the provider’s work, whether or not such 
responsibility is warranted under the task assigned. The only way to avoid 
such risk would be to have the recipient of services specifically decline 
this right to damages, thus forcing the service provider to anticipate the 
risk of his work to each individual and expressly contract for the 
assumption of these risks. It seems more appropriate to have the party 
looking for a service provider to assume risks inherent in the project 
unless he obtains warranties and pays for the cost of providing such 
guarantees.  
 
 
 125. Supra note 51–54 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 78–82 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Application of Economic Loss to Fraud and Negligent 
Misrepresentation Claims 
Finally, in the field of fraud and intentional misrepresentation, the 
economic loss doctrine is best looked at through the limits of 
enforceability on contract. Although defining an independent tort may be 
difficult if based solely on the potential exceptions of the economic loss 
doctrine,127 the concept embodied by Robinson Helicopter suggests that a 
proper boundary for the economic loss doctrine may be found not in 
specific definitional characteristics, but rather in the underlying concepts 
of tort and contract law. With this in mind, there is a difficulty in properly 
articulating the scope and purpose of the economic loss doctrine because 
the goals and purposes of two foundational areas of law cannot be simply 
stated. Nonetheless, the standards imposed by requiring an “independent” 
tort are not without definition. Previous case law, and the provisions that 
make contracts voidable, accurately describe what actions should be 
considered outside the protections and limitations to remedy espoused in 
contracts.128 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The underlying purpose of striving for efficiency in tort and valuing the 
intentions of parties in contract highlights the importance of a uniform law 
that is easily predictable for the parties involved. Although an ad hoc 
determination may seem worthwhile due to the relative ability of parties to 
compensate for loss, judicial decisions based on this philosophy fail to 
recognize the social value of efficiency and settled law. When judges 
make exceptions to the doctrine in order to meet individual concepts of 
fairness, they create an amorphous mass of case law, and attorneys 
everywhere struggle to determine when the rule applies and when 
exceptions are appropriate.129 Furthermore, the adjustment of damage 
awards, based on the level of fault of the tortfeasor and the idea that 
breaking a contract should lead to tort damages, directly conflicts with the 
contract principle of efficient breach.  
 
 
 127. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 104 and 114 and accompanying text. 
 129. Sandrac Ass’n v. W.R. Fizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992).  
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A. The “Other Property” Exception to Economic Loss 
Applying these principles to the problematic scenarios of the economic 
loss doctrine noted in the case history above, it seems that “other 
property” should be defined by the product injected into the stream of 
commerce, following the approach taken by the United States Supreme 
Court in Saratoga Fishing.130 The rule would serve as a default 
mechanism when contracts do not specifically prescribe another method of 
insuring loss; thus, parties would be encouraged to include the value of 
individual expertise in the contract price.131 Defendants would be 
protected from double liability, and plaintiffs would get the value placed 
on the contract at the time of negotiation. The economic loss doctrine 
could efficiently serve its role as a threshold determination because a 
hearing would not be necessary, thereby serving the goals initially 
articulated by Justice Traynor and Justice Blackmun.132 As long as both 
parties have access rights to information regarding the negotiations, this 
approach allows both parties to seek information and reach the most 
efficient outcome.  
B. The Service Contract Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine 
The arguments regarding the application of the economic loss doctrine 
to service contracts suggest a need for properly defined default rules for 
service contracts, such as those established by the UCC for transactions 
involving goods. Default rules would force proper risk disclosures and 
encourage informed negotiations for service contracts. In order to establish 
a set of default rules, a consumer’s knowledge of his own risk and the 
service provider’s proper disclosure of abilities should be considered. If 
the economic loss rule is not applied in the context of service contracts, 
 
 
 130. Supra note 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 131. A rule like the one forwarded in KB Home cannot properly protect the interests of contract 
law because an individual’s reputation and skill as an assembler of components into a complete 
product is lost in the court valuation of contract coverage. See KB Home v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 587, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). This in turn will give advantage to individuals who do not 
have skill and will force professionals to eschew the value of training in a contract price.  
 132. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1985). Justice 
Blackmun implied that the scope of “other property” should be the integrated package supplied by the 
manufacturer, arguing  
[s]ince all but the very simplest of machines have component parts, [a contrary] holding 
would require a finding of “property damage” in virtually every case where a product 
damages itself. Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict 
products liability.  
Id. (quoting N. Power & Eng’g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981)). 
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potential liability makes it more difficult for service providers to perform 
functions at prices that the whole society can afford. Additionally, 
providers are forced to take exorbitant risks with their business in every 
service contract. This risk, in turn, falls disproportionately on the smallest 
businesses, thereby granting a monopoly on the service industry to 
established businesses with the wherewithal and protection from such 
suits. Such developments could have extremely harmful effects on 
competition in our service economy. 
C. The Application of Economic Loss to Fraud and Negligent 
Misrepresentation Claims 
Finally, for fraud and misrepresentation claims, it seems that the 
economic loss doctrine is better analyzed by considering rules regarding 
the enforceability and voidability of contracts. If the contract is voidable, 
it seems that a party should be able to resort to tort remedies for damages 
because the limited remedies of contracts are eliminated and damage 
exists that should be remedied for the good of society. The language in 
Robinson Helicopter provides a helpful analysis by suggesting that tort 
remedies are available when the breach is intended or fraudulent. But, this 
approach must find its place between the business community’s general 
rejection of the justifications provided by the theory of efficient breach133 
and contract law’s limitation to compensatory damages.134 Potentially, the 
burden of proving international breach and the requirement that a distinct 
tort duty is breached provides the protection to contracting parties that 
would eliminate the need for the economic loss doctrine. Unfortunately, 
this solution simply forces plaintiffs to allege intent and creates a tort duty 
to circumvent one of the purposes of the doctrine, but it seems to be the 
best solution on the margin. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a great value in defining the economic loss doctrine according 
to the underlying principles of contract and tort law. The value of defining 
the doctrine has increased as tort remedies and the fear of tort damages has 
increased, but pervasive misunderstandings still exist. Evaluations should 
adhere more completely to the theory, history, and principles behind the 
doctrine. This approach would lead to defining “other property” according 
 
 
 133. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 113, § 55.15.  
 134. Id. §§ 55.8, 55.11.  
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to the item injected into the stream of commerce, applying the economic 
loss doctrine to service contracts, and following contract enforceability 
rules for fraud or misrepresentation claims. 
Unfortunately, because it is impossible to predict all of the situations 
that may arise under the doctrine, it becomes the duty of lawyers and 
judges alike to understand what is at stake in litigating the doctrine. To 
this end, the Restatement of Products Liability must readdress the issue of 
the economic loss doctrine and specifically deal with the scenarios 
presented. 
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